It has been years since that major film company declared bankruptcy. It has been years since many good people were "impacted," not only in association with Chapter 11, but also along the way on the long slide into unprofitability that made the bankruptcy inevitable.
There have been numerous articles explaining the demise of the film giant. It was this, it was that, they were blindsided, no one could make the transition they needed to make, it was predicted by the Mayan Calendar, and so on. The accounts are true, to a point. They look at one facet or another, and make valid points, but the story is much more complex. And none of the accounts have the viewpoint of an insider. Not only an insider's viewpoint, but that of insiders without the benefit of the potent management Kool-aid.
So this new forum has been created. A cast of tens of thousands have something to say, and though this blog will certainly not be comprehensive, there will be a broad examination of the carcass of the once great company. Many will be encouraged to contribute.
The intent is to provide anecdotal evidence exposing the myriad of reasons for the failure. The actual experiences of those inside the Big Yellow Box. And by airing these often astounding stories and observations, provide insight into how other businesses and corporations can avoid the same result.
Is your curiosity piqued? I certainly hope so. I hope you are moved to read and respond to every post, lauding the insights, and pointing out the errors and the inconsistencies. Or better yet...contribute!
The story is too large for anyone to know it all, but your viewpoint is invaluable. Particularly if you accompanied us on the company's ride into oblivion.
There have been numerous articles explaining the demise of the film giant. It was this, it was that, they were blindsided, no one could make the transition they needed to make, it was predicted by the Mayan Calendar, and so on. The accounts are true, to a point. They look at one facet or another, and make valid points, but the story is much more complex. And none of the accounts have the viewpoint of an insider. Not only an insider's viewpoint, but that of insiders without the benefit of the potent management Kool-aid.
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| Maybe this WAS the reason. |
The intent is to provide anecdotal evidence exposing the myriad of reasons for the failure. The actual experiences of those inside the Big Yellow Box. And by airing these often astounding stories and observations, provide insight into how other businesses and corporations can avoid the same result.
Is your curiosity piqued? I certainly hope so. I hope you are moved to read and respond to every post, lauding the insights, and pointing out the errors and the inconsistencies. Or better yet...contribute!
The story is too large for anyone to know it all, but your viewpoint is invaluable. Particularly if you accompanied us on the company's ride into oblivion.

This should be interesting. When I moved here in 1983, I believe there were 60,000 employees at Kodak in Rochester. I had some neighbors who worked for Kodak and Kodak was one of our (IBM) biggest accounts here in Rochester. I look forward to the stories.
ReplyDeleteSo it's your fault.
DeleteAs with most things it's not a simple answer. In my opinion it was a combination of thinks.
ReplyDelete1. I was in Emulsion Technology. We laughed at digital. It was no where near as good as film. We never expected it to as good as what we made. I still think is not as good but it's damn close. It was group think.
2. The internet! OK, digital wasn't as good but now you can take picture and send it anywhere in the world, in seconds! No film to buy. No waiting for processing. The whole way we viewed imaging changed over night! That demand pushed digital to get better and it did. Is it as good as the best films? I don't know. I'm too far removed from that world now.
3. Kodak was the best in the world at coating. No one could coat materials on substrate like we could. Kodak was very reluctant to abandon that technology.
Management missed both trends. Digital and the imaging culture change. If they had seen it coming they might have been able to adjust. I don't know. When a drastically different technology takes over a product or service you provide it's tough. The 100s of ice companies that delivered ice for ice boxes all went out of business. No went into making refrigerators. Kodak saw itself as a coating company. Not an imaging company.
There is some truth in what you say, but definitely not a simple answer. I'm not sure they missed the trends. They clearly missed the rate of change, but certainly knew the change was coming. It's what they did in reaction to that knowledge that is interesting.
DeleteRandy; I love your idea. What really happened hasn't been told yet.
ReplyDeleteWhen I started at Kodak in 1981, I was working with a guy, (Rory), who liked the fact that Kodak was so large, if he didn't like what he was doing he could always find something else to do. We did everything back then. I never understood how we could make a better product if we outsourced most of the work. Eventually we eliminated many of those jobs, like the human factors group who studied how people took pictures with their cameras. They even studied where to put the button in order to reduce how much the camera shook and blurred the film when you take the shot. I think of the people who knew where to put that button and cringe every time I take a photo with my phone.
I think maybe those people cringe and take a picture of you with their cell phones. Which of course Kodak worked on, but squandered any advantage. But that's another blog.
DeleteAs a new employee in 1974, I went to a new employee orientation.
ReplyDeleteI recall two pertinent statements Kodak made at that meeting.
1) The demise of film photography was expected by the year 2000.
2) We were needed to invent products that "could be produced for $0.25, made for $1 and were addictive"
Consumables...a great topic for a blog!
DeleteIn 1987, the marketing manager of the new Electronic Photography Division, told me to stop proposing new product ideas that involved using or connecting to a personal computer. He swore Kodak would never become a computer peripheral manufacturer. Although technically, we already were at the time.
ReplyDeleteI think he left out one word. "Kodak would never become a 'successful' computer peripheral manufacturer."
DeleteThat's probably true, but no, I don't think he did. He really hated computers, he was an old consumer film guy. Used an old Underwood typewriter to send his letters, complete with cross-outs and white outs.
DeleteI entered the world of Kodak from the world of commercial photofinishing. At that time there were people called TSR's (Technical Sales Representatives). I knew that was the job for me and I joined Kodak and eventually became a TSR (my dream job at the time).
ReplyDeleteA very early influence for me was A TSR called Wayne Swift, who called on me when I was a photo-finisher. At that time (and this was a long time ago, because I retired from Kodak with 41 years on the clock), Wayne was introducing the Instamatic camera to photo-finishers. I remember one statement Wayne made, that as I look back on it was very telling: "Kodak does not mind a little competition, a long as it's 'little' competition.